But “No on 8” was also a reactive campaign that did not anticipate the opposition’s arguments to sway swing voters. Bloggers were effective at pushing memes to define the opposition, but it failed to define much of the race. And “No on 8” did not push a simple and compelling message – “Obama Opposes Prop 8” – to the African-American community until the other side beat them to it, forcing them to play catch-up. This is no time for making excuses, or inspiring words that we’re part of a greater struggle. Our right to marry just got taken away from us, and we’ve got to be smart if we’re going to get it back.(emphasis added) And some validation of my theories:
Finally, I did go to the “No on 8” campaign office in the Castro as often as I could—but quickly became frustrated at what they were asking volunteers to do. I was happy talking on the phone with swing voters—which was useful and effective—but they seemed more interested in having us do visibility in San Francisco, going to strongly liberal (even gay) parts of town to make sure our base knew they had to vote “no.” Rather than preaching to the choir, we were told this was useful because much of our base was confused—that some supporters think they’re supposed to vote “yes” on Prop 8 to affirm gay marriage.(emphasis added) This comes close to paralelling my criticisms of the No on 8 campaign. I'd, of course, connect the final dot and say it wasn't the location of the visibility that was the problem, it was that visibility was emphasized over actual GOTV.
Still looking for more on the way things were run around the state, so if anyone has anything . . . .